The Difficult Wargame Of Sorting Financial Intelligence Signals

 | Jul 22, 2018 01:28AM ET

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Russians became hyper-aware of US and NATO counter movements. There was an increase in bellicose rhetoric on both sides, and the Andropov years had left the Soviet leadership weakened by economic stagnation increasingly worried that the US just might launch a first-strike attack.

The Communists developed a systematic intelligence approach in response. It’s not like the movies; you can’t just decide one day to launch an assault that would alter human civilization forever. Preparations were required, even if they could be made surreptitiously.

If there was to be a nuclear surprise, what would the Americans do beforehand? How would Western leadership, command and control functions, be moved and prepared? Which specific assets would have to be readied and put into service? Etc.

A great deal of Russian counterintelligence effort went into identifying and then tracking these individual pieces of the Cold War chessboard. The Soviets would keep up on as many as they could thinking that if enough of them moved simultaneously in certain ways that could signal increasing war readiness on the part of the United States or Britain. This method of interpretation might even deliver a definitive enough prewar signal that the Communists could then use to hit the West before they got the chance to attack.

This process was actually put into action in late 1983. Operation Able Archer was meant to be a large scale NATO war game realistic enough in depth as well as detail that would simulate, ironically, a Soviet attack. It wasn’t just US Navy ships maneuvering together with British and French counterparts, it involved military assets of all kinds as well as participation by political leaders. To the Soviets, it sure looked like the real thing with warning signs going off everywhere in progressively more uniform fashion.

Fortunately, it was merely a close call. Though subsequently declassified Russian documents indicate just how far the Soviet leadership had come to believe about Able Archer as if it were really a war pretext, these were ultimately false signals over interpreted by the tense environment.

Though the stakes aren’t so consequential, our challenge in trying to identify deflation or reflation is similar. There is no one price or indication that clearly defines the sharp boundaries between one or the other. Just as there wasn’t a perfect system for identifying actual war preparations between Cold War adversaries, we are handed a less-than-perfect, often muddied projection of where these cycles may be swinging back and forth.