How Helicopter Money Could Affect Gold

 | Oct 14, 2016 08:16AM ET

Since the NIRP has not yielded the expected results – it could have actually weakened the condition of the banking sector and its ability to expand lending – a hot debate about the use of another weapon in the central banks’ heroic struggle with the deflationary pressure started. We mean of course helicopter money, also called monetary finance or money-financed fiscal programs. Supporters argue that it is a necessary option to revive economic growth and generate inflation, while opponents consider it a fancy name for printing money and monetizing fiscal deficits. Who is right and what does it imply for the gold market?

As we wrote in one edition of the Gold News Monitor, the term ‘helicopter money’ goes back to Milton Friedman who wrote in 1969:

“Let us suppose now that one day a helicopter flies over this community and drops an additional $1,000 in bills from the sky, which is, of course, hastily collected by members of the community.”

The idea, although in a different context, was revived in 2002 by Ben Bernanke. What is important is that helicopter money may be understood two ways. Some people interpret the metaphor of helicopter drops quite literally as transferring money from the central bank directly to the citizens, bypassing the financial sector or government. We could dub this version as ‘helicopter money for the people’.

Just imagine that the Fed transfers each month, let’s say, $500 for each American. Would it not be the sweetest monetary policy ever? Well, not necessarily, since this radical or people’s version of helicopter money could generate the highest inflation rate. We know that quantitative easing was also believed to increase inflation (or even cause hyperinflation). However, this time is really different! You see, the problem with the current monetary transmission mechanism is that the central bank affects the amount of banks’ reserves, but it does not control directly the credit expansion, which depends on the banks’ willingness to lend and borrowers’ eagerness to borrow. This is why quantitative easing, contrary to many fears, did not lead to higher prices of consumer goods (although it supported asset prices), because the increase in commercial banks’ reserves did not quickly translate into a dynamic growth in lending addressed to the general public. Indeed, as one can see in the chart below, after the financial crisis burst forth, the total credit to the private non-financial sector started to rise no earlier than in 2011, despite the spike in banks’ reserves in 2008-2009.

Chart 1: Excess reserves of depositary institutions (green line, right axis, millions of $) and total credit to private non-financial sector (red line, left axis, billions of $) from 2006 and 2015.

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