Should Corporate, Economic And Monetary Policy Be Realigned?

 | Nov 11, 2020 06:39AM ET

In this article, we present a two-headed cobra effect. First, government legislation designed to limit executive compensation and second, the influence of economists and academia to base executive compensation on “performance.”

h2 Bush vs. Clinton/h2

In the early 1990s, like today, there was a disproportionate gap between corporate executive compensation and employees. There was also discontent from academia that the level of executive compensation was not justifiable based on performance. Many leaders thought that closing the compensation gap would benefit employees and the economy.

At the time in 1992, there was a presidential election between George Bush, the sitting President, and the two-term governor from Arkansas, Bill Clinton. Part of Clinton’s campaign pledge was to tame what he deemed “excessive executive pay.”

Specifically, Clinton intended to reverse a recent veto by President George Bush, limiting corporate tax deductions for executive compensation.

Elected in November of 1992, Clinton soon after signed into law section 162(m) of the IRS code. The code limits corporate deductibility of executive pay to $1 million for “named executives” at publically traded companies.

Financially penalizing companies with high wage-earning executives may seem like a smart way to limit compensation. Then again, putting a bounty on cobra heads also seems like a reasonable way to get rid of cobras.

h2 30 Years Later/h2

Now, 30 years later, we can clinically evaluate the effectiveness of that legislation. The graph below illustrates one measure comparing executive pay to worker compensation.